Ken Alibek

Colonel Kanatzhan (Kanat) Alibekov (Kazakh: Қанатжан Әлібеков; Russian: Канатжан Алибеков; born 1950) — known as Dr. Kenneth Alibek since 1992 — is a former Soviet physician, scientist and biological warfare (BW) expert of Kazakh descent. He is a military physician, has PhD in microbiology and ScD (Doctor of Sciences) in biotechnology. He rose rapidly in the ranks of the Soviet Army to become the First Deputy Director of Biopreparat where he oversaw a vast program of biodefense and BW facilities and was responsible for research and production of various pharmaceuticals and biologics. In 1992 he defected to the United States, has become an American citizen, and makes his living as a biodefense consultant, speaker, researcher and entrepreneur. He has actively participated in the development of biodefense strategy for the US government, and has repeatedly advised the US Congress and other governments on biotechnology issues. He is Chief Executive Officer of AFG Biosolutions Inc. (US) and President and Chief Scientific Officer of MaxWell US (US/Ukraine).[1]

Contents

Biography

Youth and early career

Kenneth Alibek was born Kanat Alibekov in Kauchuk, in the Kazakh SSR of the Soviet Union (in present day Kazakhstan) and grew up in Almaty, the republic's former capital.

His exceptional academic performance while studying military medicine at the Tomsk Medical Institute and his family’s noted patriotism led to his selection to work for Biopreparat, the secret BW program overseen by the Soviet Union’s Council of Ministers. His first assignment (1975) was to the Eastern European Branch of the Institute of Applied Biochemistry (IAB) near Omutninsk, a combined pesticide production facility and reserve BW production plant intended for activation in a time of war. At Omutninsk, Alibekov mastered the art and science of formulating and evaluating nutrient media and cultivation conditions for the optimization of microbial growth. It was here that he expanded his medical school laboratory skills into the complex skill set required for industrial level production of microorganisms and their toxins.[2]

After less than a year at Omutninsk, Alibekov was transferred to the Siberian Branch of the IAB near Berdsk (another name of the branch was the Berdsk scientific and production base). With the assistance of a colleague, he designed and constructed a microbiology research and development laboratory that worked on techniques to optimize production of biological formulations. After several promotions over a short period of time, Alibekov was transferred back to Omutninsk where he quickly rose to the position of Deputy Director. He was soon transferred to the Kazakhstan Scientific and Production Base in Stepnogorsk (another reserve BW facility) to become the new Director of that facility. Officially, he was Deputy Director of the Progress Scientific and Production Association, a manufacturer of fertilizer and pesticide. At Stepnogorsk, Alibekov created the most efficient industrial scale assembly line for biological formulations. In a time of war, the assembly line could be used to produce weaponized anthrax. Continued successes in science and biotechnology led to more promotions which resulted in a transfer to Moscow.[3]

Work at Biopreparat-Moscow

In Moscow, Alibekov began his service as Deputy Chief of the Biosafety Directorate at Biopreparat. He was later promoted (1988) to First Deputy Director of Biopreparat where he not only oversaw the biological weapons facilities but also the significant number of pharmaceutical facilities that produced antibiotics, vaccines, sera, and interferon for the public. Though the time he had available was short, he took this additional responsibility to public health seriously.

In response to a Spring 1990 announcement that the Ministry of Medical and Microbiological Industry was to be reorganized, Alibekov drafted and forwarded through channels a memo to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev proposing the cessation of Biopreparat’s BW work. Though Gorbachev approved the proposal, an additional paragraph had been secretly inserted into Alibekov’s draft resulting in a presidential decree that not only ordered the end of Biopreparat’s BW work but also required them to remain prepared for future production.

Though disappointed by the double dealing, Alibekov used his position at Biopreparat and the authority granted to him by the first part of the decree to begin destruction of the BW program. Specifically, he ordered the dismantlement of BW production and testing capabilities at a number of research and development facilities including Stepnogorsk, Kol’tsovo, Obolensk and a number of others. He also negotiated a concurrent appointment to a Biopreparat facility called Biomash. Biomash designed and produced technical equipment for microbial cultivation and testing. He planned to increase the amount of product sent to the hospitals and the civilian medical laboratories beyond the 40% allocated at the time.[4]

Life in the United States

Kanatzhan Alibekov was subsequently placed in charge of intensive preparations for inspections of Soviet biological facilities by a joint American and British delegation. While participating in the subsequent Soviet inspection of American facilities, his growing suspicion that the United States did not have an offensive BW program was confirmed before his return to Russia (the Soviet Union dissolved while he was in the US). In January 1992, not long after his return from the US, Kenneth Alibek, protesting against BW work continuation, resigned from both the Soviet Army and from Biopreparat and became jobless. In October 1992 he emigrated with his family to the US, despite being forbidden to do so by the KGB.[5]

Dr. Kenneth Alibek adds: “Long before my emigration, I resigned from the Soviet Army, left my administrative and scientific positions in Moscow, refused to accept a Russian citizenship, informed Russian security officials that I would be leaving for the United States, became jobless for more than 9 months and, after I got my parents’ blessing, I left the former Soviet Union (it was not Russia). I do not think it can be considered defection even though Russian security officials did not want me to go overseas. But it was a different time, I was not a Russian citizen and they could not have done anything officially. Only after that I emigrated with all my family”

Since moving to the US, Alibekov — who simplified his name to Kenneth (Ken) Alibek — has provided the government with a detailed accounting of the former Soviet BW program and has testified before the US Congress on numerous occasions (see also Sverdlovsk anthrax leak). He has provided guidance to the intelligence, policy, national security, and medical communities and has returned to the pure biomedical research that captured his interest as a medical student. He was the impetus behind the creation of an innovative biodefense graduate education program at George Mason University (GMU) that drew students from across the country and has served in the program as both a Distinguished Professor of Medical Microbiology and as the Director of Education. He also developed the plans for GMU’s biosafety level three (BSL-3) research facility and was instrumental in obtaining $40 million dollars of grants from the federal and state governments for construction of the facility.[6]

In 1999, Alibek published an autobiographical account of his work in the Soviet Union and his defection.[7]

Pharmaceutical entrepreneur and researcher

On 11 March 2006, Alibek announced that, owing to substantive differences between himself and GMU over the future of the Graduate Programs in Biodefense, he would not be teaching classes beyond the Spring semester and that he was resigning from GMU effective 27 August 2006. In an agreement with his students, he volunteered his time from Spring 2006 through Spring 2007 to help them earn their doctoral degrees.

Kenneth Alibek is the President, Chief Scientific Officer and Chief Executive Officer at AFG Biosolutions, Inc in Gaithersburg, Maryland [8] where he and his scientific team continue their development of advanced solutions for antimicrobial immunity. Motivated by the lack of affordable anti-cancer therapies available in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, AFG is using Alibek’s biotechnology experience to plan, build, and manage a new pharmaceutical production facility designed specifically to address this problem. Alibek created this new pharmaceutical production company, MaxWell Biocorporation (MWB), in 2006 and serves as its CEO and President. Based in Washington, D.C., with several subsidiaries and affiliates in the United States and Ukraine, MWB’s main goal is said to be the creation of a new, large-scale, high-technology, ultra-modern pharmaceutical 'fill-and-finish' facility in Ukraine. Off-patent generic pharmaceuticals produced at this site are supposed to target severe oncological, cardiological, immunological, and chronic infectious diseases. MWB is said to be the biggest and most modern pharmaceutical production facility in all of the former Soviet Union. It is intended to serve as the flagship of a larger healthcare complex at a campus just outside the Ukrainian capital city of Kiev in the town of Boryspil. Construction of the Boryspil facility began in April 2007 and was completed in March 2008; initial production is scheduled to begin in 2008. The stated intention is that high quality pharmaceuticals will be produced and become an affordable source of therapy for millions of underprivileged who currently have no therapeutic options [9]

The main focus of Dr. Alibek's current research is to develop novel modalities for therapy of late stage oncologic diseases and other chronic degenerative pathologies and disorders. He focuses on a role of chronic viral and bacterial infections in causing age-related diseases and premature aging. Additionally, he develops and implements novel systemic immunotherapy methods for late stage cancer patients [9]

LA Times criticism and responses

In 2007, the LA Times published an article criticizing the scientific credibility of Alibek's recent work and his motivations[10]. The article 1) did not present Alibek's rebuttal to any of the allegations, 2) was from a newspaper which publicly apologized to P. Diddy for publishing a defammatory article based upon government documents which had been intentionally altered (see NME article "P Diddy's Lawyer Lashes Out at LA Times")[11] and 3) was written by an author who must have known publishing such an inflammatory article about someone considered a public figure would help him to sell any future books he chose to write on biodefense related topics. Regardless, excerpts from and some responses to the LA Times article are below:

Biographical chronology

Publications

Pre-defection

Alibek published more than 80 articles in classified journals on the development of new types of biological weapons and on medical aspects of biodefense prior to his defection to the United States.

Post-defection

Books

Book chapters

Monographs

Op-Eds

Selected Congressional Testimony

References

  1. ^ www.maxwellusa.com.ua
  2. ^ Anderson, D. (2006), Lessons Learned from the Former Soviet Biological Warfare Program; UMI Dissertation Services, UMI NO. 3231331
  3. ^ Anderson (2006), Op. cit.
  4. ^ Anderson (2006), Op. cit.
  5. ^ Anderson (2006), Op. cit.
  6. ^ Anderson (2006), Op. cit.
  7. ^ Alibek, Ken and Stephen Handelman (1999), Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It, Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6 [1]
  8. ^ AFG Biosolutions
  9. ^ a b {MaxwellUSA
  10. ^ Willman, David (2007), “Selling the Threat of Bioterrorism”, The Los Angeles Times, 1 July 2007.
  11. ^ NME (2008), [[P Diddy's Lawyer Lashes Out at LA Times, 28 March 2008]][2],
  12. ^ BMC Immunology,2010 May 18;11(1):23
  13. ^ Emerging Infectious Diseases May;12(5):873-5
  14. ^ "Random Samples", Science, 11 October 2002: Vol. 298. no. 5592, p. 359
  15. ^ Willman, Op. cit
  16. ^ Willman, Op. cit
  17. ^ Alibek K, and C Bailey (2004), "BioShield or biogap?", Biosecur Bioterror; 2(2):132-3

See also: